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CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 
BORDER VEHICLE DETENTION & SEARCH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In U.S. v. Corral- Villavicencio, l the Ninth Circuit held that 
a stop and search of an automobile near the border, while not 
made pursuant to a valid extended border search, was justified 
because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
was involved in criminal activity and from the stop, gained prob-
able cause to search the trunk of the vehicle. 
After observing a vehicle driven by the defendant enter a 
park near the Arizona-Mexican border in the early morning 
hours, customs patrol officers checked the vehicle plates for re-
gistration.2 Upon finding that the vehicle was registered to a fe-
male and not locally owned, and upon observing the vehicle 
leave the park ten minutes after entering a well known smug-
gling area, the officers stopped the vehicle.3 
During the stop, officers discovered that the defendant did 
not know who owned the car and that he could only produce 
title signed and notorized in blank.' Officers further observed 
that the defendant appeared very nervous. G Based upon these 
facts, the officers opened the trunk of the vehicle, seized over 
one-hundred pounds of marijuana,S and arrested the defendant.' 
At trial, the district court denied defendant's motion to sup-
1. u.s. v. Corral· Villavicencio, No. 83-1269, slip op. (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985) (per 
Tang, J.; the other panel members were Hug and Farris, J.J.). 
2. Id. at 2. 
3.ld. 
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press the evidence of marijuana and any statements made by 
him during the stop.8 The defendant was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute marijuana and he appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.9 
II. BACKGROUND 
In United States v. Cortez,I° the Supreme Court held that 
an investigatory vehicle stop by Border Patrol officers was con-
stitutional. The stop was based upon information obtained from 
a two month investigation of the modus operandi of an illegal 
alien smuggler and upon the officer's observations during the 
morning of the stop.ll The Court stated that the test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of the stop was whether, based 
upon the "whole picture" an experienced Border Patrol officer 
could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle stopped was 
being used in criminal activity. 12 
In United States v. Bates,13 the Ninth Circuit upheld a stop 
as valid and found probable cause to support a search of the 
trunk of a vehicle where customs officers twice observed a vehi-
cle drive into a deserted warehouse parking lot known as a 
smuggling area. The officers stopped the vehicle and observed 
handprints in the dust on the vehicles trunk lid.14 Upon ques-
tioning the driver, the officers learned that the driver was not 
the owner of the car. 111 The driver's behavior was also suspicious 
and matched the modus operandi of a drug smuggler. IS Based 
on these facts, the court held that the seemingly innocent events 
had "proceeded to the point where a prudent person could say 
that an innocent course of conduct was substantially less likely 
8.Id. 
9. Id. at 1. 
10. 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
11. Id. at 418-22. 
12. Id. at 421-22. See also U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873 (1975) holding that 
the reasonableness of a stop depends on balancing the public interest and the individ-
ual's right to be free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Id. at 878. The Court 
found that a stop of a vehicle by the Border Patrol based upon the single factor that the 
occupants were of Mexican ancestry was unconstitutional under the balancing test 
above. Id. at 885-86. 
13. 533 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976). 
14. Id. at 468. 
15. Id. at 468-69. 
16. Id. at 469. 
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than a criminal one."17 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Corral, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the search 
was not justified as an "extended border search" which does not 
require probable cause, because the customs officers were not 
"reasonably certain" that parcels had been smuggled across the 
border or placed in a vehicle crossing the border. 18 The court 
then discussed whether, under the facts, the initial stop was 
constitutional. 19 
In finding that the initial stop was justified by a reasonable 
suspicion that the driver was involved in illegal activity, the 
court looked at the totality of the circumstances as required by 
Cortez.20 The court noted that the officers observed the defen-
dant's car driving in and out of an area six-tenths of a mile from 
the border in an area known for contraband pickups. The court 
also pointed to the officers' experience in determining that the 
time lapse between the defendant's entrance and exit from the 
area was a normal time for such a contraband pickup and that 
the driver was not the owner of the vehicle.21 The court held 
that these facts amply supported a brief investigatory stop/all 
The court then analyzed whether the search of the trunk of 
the vehicle during the stop was based upon probable cause.lIa 
The court found that the officers' level of suspicion was raised to 
that of probable cause when, after the stop, the agents con-
firmed that the defendant was not the owner of the vehicle, and, 
noticed upon questioning, that the defendant appeared very ner-
VOUS.24 The court held that in light of the events preceeding the 
stop and the officer's knowledge the defendant's conduct was 
17. 1d. The court further stated, "[t)he totality of the evidence, as viewed by the 
experienced customs officers familiar with the smuggling methods of the area, estab-
lished probable cause to believe that Bates' car was being used to transport contraband." 
1d. 
18. U.S. v. Corral-Villavicencio, No. 83-1269, slip op. at 6, (9th Cir. Feb. IS, 1985). 
19. 1d. at 8. 
20. 1d. (citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) and U.S. v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884). 
21. Corral, No. 83-1269, slip op. at 8. 
22.1d. 
23. 1d. at 9. 
24. 1d. at 9-10. 
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consistent with that of a person smuggling contraband, probable 
cause existed to search the trunk of the vehicle.211 The court 
found that the knowledge of the officers in this case was analo-
gous to that of the officers in Bates, where the suspect followed 
the modus operandi for a contraband pickup.26 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Corral is consistent with prior federal cases in the area of 
vehicle detentions and searches near the border.27 The case em-
phasizes the Ninth Circuit's willingness to defer considerable 
judgment of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to border 
patrol officers familiar with the repeated patterns of contraband 
smugglers. 
Michelle T. Leighton* 
25. Id. at 10. The court noted that in Bates, the officers observed the suspect driving 
a vehicle in a known smuggling area during the early morning hours, acting consistent 
with the modus operandi for a contraband pickup. Bates, 533 F.2d at 469. See also dis-
cussion of Bates in text, supra. 
26. Corral, No. 83-1269, slip op. at 10. (citing Bates, 533 F.2d at 469). The court also 
cited United States v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1974), where a search of a 
vehicle was supported by probable cause after officers observed the vehicle slow down 
and stop at a known smuggling point next to the border. Id. at 279. 
27. Compare the following federal cases: U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), U.S. v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), U.S. v. Bates, 533 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), and 
U.S. v. Kessler, 497 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1974). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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